Woofun AI reports that the launch of Open Standard's dollar-pegged stablecoin, OpenUSD (OUSD), triggered an immediate crisis of credibility when a purported roster of over 140 global giants—including Visa, Mastercard, Stripe, American Express, BlackRock, BNY, Standard Chartered, Google, Shopify, Samsung, Coinbase, Solana, Ripple, and Circle—began to disintegrate within days. Although the initial announcement caused a dip in Circle's stock price, the subsequent revelation that many listed entities had not formally agreed to participate exposed the fragility of the project's foundational marketing strategy.

The structural design of OUSD, spearheaded by Zach Abrams, co-founder of Bridge (acquired by Stripe in 2024), distinguishes itself through three primary mechanisms: zero fees for minting and redemption, the absence of trading volume limits, and a profit-sharing model that distributes returns from reserve assets to adoption partners rather than retaining them with the issuer. Governance is decentralized via a board of partners, mimicking the structure of payment networks like Visa and Mastercard, with initial deployment planned across Solana, Polygon, Aptos, and Stellar.

However, the validity of the partner list was quickly challenged. On July 3, South Korean media outlet Chosun Biz reported that 13 Korean companies on the list had distanced themselves from the alliance. Samsung Electronics stated there had been no formal negotiations and expressed confusion regarding its alleged role. New Korea Financial Group, Dunamu (parent company of Upbit), and K Bank echoed similar sentiments, noting that Open Standard had merely asked for willingness to participate, to which they replied "we will evaluate," yet their names were subsequently published on the official member list. Some firms only discovered their inclusion through local news, expressing astonishment at being listed despite only stating they would "consider it if everything goes smoothly."

Skepticism extended beyond Korea. Gabor Gurbacs, founder of OpenAssets in the U.S., noted that several clients on the list had never signed or agreed to anything, suggesting that "either the media has severely distorted the facts, or this participant list is misleading." Despite these denials, the list is not entirely fabricated; executives from Mastercard, Stripe, Visa, Coinbase, BlackRock, BNY, and Adyen have endorsed the project, with Stripe confirming it would make OUSD the default stablecoin for its platform merchants.

The core controversy centers on OUSD's profit-sharing model. Being listed as a partner implies entitlement to economic rights from reserve profits, transforming the question of formal participation from a public relations matter into a tangible business and credibility concern. This ambiguity undermines the project's legitimacy, as the financial incentives promised to partners cannot be realized without verified contractual agreements.

This incident reflects a broader trend of marketing inertia in the crypto industry, where projects leverage the reputations of giants to build momentum. Chainstory analyzed nearly 3,000 crypto press releases from the second half of 2025, finding that high-risk projects accounted for 35.6% of all published projects, while projects marked as scams accounted for 26.9%. These suspicious categories combined accounted for over 62% of the total press releases, whereas low-risk projects comprised only about 27%. This data suggests that a significant portion of industry announcements may lack substantive backing.

The historical precedent for such "All-Star Alliances" failing is Facebook's Libra. In the summer of 2019, Facebook announced Libra with a white paper boasting a luxurious lineup: Visa, Mastercard, PayPal, and Stripe on the payment side; eBay and Shopify in e-commerce; Coinbase in crypto; and top venture capital firms like a16z. Almost half of Silicon Valley appeared to rally behind the project.

However, a congressional hearing shifted the tide, with governments concerned about impacts on sovereign currencies and the dollar's status. France opposed the project first, while the U.S. Congress questioned Facebook's suitability given its privacy scandals. Regulatory pressure forced allies to withdraw; on October 4, 2019, PayPal exited, followed a week later by Stripe, Visa, eBay, and Mastercard. The alliance disintegrated before its first council meeting.

The project's subsequent decline involved renaming to Diem, moving headquarters from Switzerland to the U.S., pegging the currency solely to the dollar, and operating independently from Facebook. By 2022, the project was sold to Silvergate for approximately $200 million, marking its end. The lesson from Libra is that an impressive alliance list does not equate to a functional product or established real channels.

Notably, Visa, Mastercard, and Stripe, which abandoned Libra, are now marquee names on the OUSD list, raising questions about whether history will repeat itself.

Woofun AI data shows that Circle CEO Jeremy Allaire welcomes the competition but emphasizes that the stablecoin market is driven by network effects and tends toward a winner-takes-all structure. According to The Block's dashboard, the total market capitalization of dollar-pegged stablecoins exceeds $291 billion, with Tether's USDT accounting for about $184.3 billion and Circle's USDC exceeding $73 billion. Allaire argues that building such a network takes time and cannot be accelerated by marketing alliances alone.

Regarding OUSD's "free minting and redemption" model, Allaire contends that market realities often force adjustments, and Circle relies on contractual mechanisms rather than blanket free approaches. He bluntly stated that distributing all income equals "starving the infrastructure," leading to systemic underinvestment and preventing significant platform growth. He further criticized the "alliance model," noting that such products historically perform poorly in scalability and agility due to poor coordination, misaligned incentives, and slow progress. He observed that while companies are eager to put logos on lists and proclaim openness, their business departments ultimately make decisions based on customer needs, not alliance loyalty.

Statistics from Artemis indicate that as of July 2026, the total supply of dollar-pegged stablecoins is about $300 billion, with USDT around $180 billion and USDC about $78 billion, together accounting for nearly 90%. All new stablecoins combined amount to about $40 billion, a small fraction at the bottom of the stack. Allaire believes that while many stablecoins have circulation, most stems from promotions and incentives, with real usage limited by insufficient liquidity and network utility.

The success of stablecoins ultimately depends on real use cases and genuine users, such as B2B payments, merchant settlements, and cross-border payroll, rather than marketing alliances. While OUSD has the backing of substantial giants and a distinct product model, its future remains uncertain. The turmoil reveals a recurring issue in the crypto industry: giant alliances can provide initial momentum, but the status of USDT and USDC is built on real application scenarios in exchanges, DeFi, payments, and cross-border traffic. Before these utilities are established, OUSD risks issuing empty checks to the market.